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Abstract—To check the correctness of heterogeneous models of
a complex critical system is challenging to meet the certiﬁcation
standard. Such guarantee can be provided by embedding the het-
erogeneous models into an integrated modelling framework. This
work is proposed in the B-PERFect project of RATP (Parisian
Public Transport Operator and Maintainer), it aims to apply
formal veriﬁcation using the PERF approach on the integrated
safety-critical software related to railway domain expressed in a
single modelling language: HLL. This paper presents a certiﬁed
translation from B formal language to HLL. The proposed
approach uses HOL as a uniﬁed logical framework to describe
the formal semantics and to formalize the translation relation of
both languages. The developed Isabelle/HOL models are proved
in order to guarantee the correctness of our translation process.
Moreover, we have also used weak-bisimulation relation to check
the correctness of translation steps. The overall approach is
illustrated through a case study issued from a railway software
system: onboard localization function. Furthermore, it discusses
the integrated veriﬁcation at system level.
Index Terms—Formal Semantics, B to HLL Translation Vali-
dation, Theorem Proving, Model Animation
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, it is well known that the development of com-
plex industrial systems, involving both hardware and soft-
ware components, is becoming a huge task requiring high
quality development processes. Moreover, when these systems
deal with critical application domains, like transportation and
aerospace, energy, etc., these processes need to set up rigor-
ous veriﬁcation and validation procedures. Formal approaches
have proved useful to deﬁne such rigorous procedures.
Furthermore, in a system engineering context, the devel-
opment of a complex system is not handled by a unique
developer. Several stakeholders are involved in the different
development processes and may handle a component (part
or a piece) of the system to be developed. Each of these
development processes gathers several development activities
and models shared and distributed among all the stakeholders.
A consequence of the involvements of many actors in such
developments is heterogeneity. Indeed, several modeling tech-
niques, programming languages, design processes, validation
and veriﬁcation procedures, etc. may be set up by each stake-
holder. Each stakeholder delivers the component (hardware
or software) he/she is in charge of. Then, the main issue
resided in the global veriﬁcation and validation of the whole
complex system. To solve this issue, one solution consists in
imposing a standardized approach based on shared processes
and languages. This approach is not realistic when the systems
are too complex.
Our concern is the validation and veriﬁcation of systems
developed by various stakeholders who use their own mod-
elling languages and development processes. We believe that
black box validation and veriﬁcation procedures can be set
up. We show that formal modelling techniques provide a
rigorous solution to allow integrated veriﬁcation and validation
activities.
Our work is inspired by railway transportation system de-
velopment processes set up at RATP. For several years, RATP
has been involved in the application of formal veriﬁcation tech-
niques to assess the safety level of railway systems which gave
birth to a formal veriﬁcation methodology called PERF (Proof
Executed over a Retro engineered Formal model) [1], designed
to be applicable to any software system independently of their
development processes and languages. The approach consists
in diving all the produced component models in a single shared
PERF pivot modelling language supporting formal veriﬁcation.
The PERF pivot language, HLL[2], is a synchronous data-ﬂow
language, similar to Lustre[3], allowing to express, in the same
formalism, the system behavior as well as safety requirements.
This translation shall be sound and semantic preserving. Once
this translation is achieved, it becomes possible to question
the obtained shared models, for veriﬁcation and validation
purposes.
In this paper, we deal with the B method [4]. The B-
PERFect project was initiated in order to investigate the
applicability of PERF on software systems developed using the
B method [4]. Software systems developed using B are valid
by correct by construction with respect to safety requirements.
The idea behind the B-PERFect project is not to replace the
formal veriﬁcation process of B but to propose a veriﬁcation
alternative to be used for an internal independent safety
assessment. This will not question the proof process of B.
However, it may eventually reveal any error in the initial
formalization of safety requirements. The proposed method
for safety-critical software veriﬁcation is a bottom-up approach
starting from the source code to the high level speciﬁcation.
On these basis, in our approach, B models are automatically
translated into HLL models. As this approach relies on a
translator tool, a vital property is the semantic preservation
and thus the certiﬁcation of the translator.
In this paper, we address the problem of validating the
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translator by proving semantic equivalence between the source
code and the target code. To prove the correctness of the
program transformation, the formal semantics of each mod-
elling language is expressed in Isabelle/HOL. Furthermore, a
formal proof of semantic preservation (semantic equivalence)
is carried out. It guarantees the equivalence between the B
source language and the HLL target language. The overall
approach is exempliﬁed through a case study borrowed from
the railway domain and supplied by RATP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the PERF approach and the case study illustrating
our approach. An overview of our framework and basic
concepts of B and HLL language are given in III. Section
IV presents the B2HLL tool. The Isabelle/HOL formalization
and the proof of the semantics equivalence is presented in
Section V. In Section VI, the animation of the Isabelle/HOL
formalization is described. Section VII discusses the related
work and Section VIII gives some concluding remarks.
II. PERF: AN INTEGRATION VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
RATP’s engineering department relies on rigorous veriﬁ-
cation methodologies based on formal methods. The use of
formal methods has been successfully applied for several
RATP projects development, revealing safety critical bugs.
RATP projects involve various subcontractors who use dif-
ferent development methods and languages. The resulting
heterogeneity enforces RATP to master all subcontractor’s
methods and languages and to manage a complex assessment
process. To deal with this complexity, a uniﬁed veriﬁcation
approach, offering an “ex post facto” proof, is applied to
each supplied product independently of the subcontractor’s
development language or method.
A. The PERF Framework
The PERF veriﬁcation process consists in translating the
source code of the system under investigation into a formal
HLL model. The safety properties, corresponding to the global
requirements of RATP, are also expressed in HLL as proof
obligations. The obtained model is completed (close loop
modelling) with constraints or assumptions describing a model
of the environment. Then, veriﬁcation is performed on the
obtained model. If the proof engine reveals counter-examples,
the corresponding scenario is analyzed in order to understand
the safety risk related to this property violation. A complete
tool chain associated to PERF (translators, counter-example
analyzers, SAT-based proof engines [5]) is available.
PERF is actually applied in every project where translators
are available. Programming and modelling languages like C,
Ada or Scade are currently supported by PERF. It has been
successfully set up to verify systems like Computer Based
Interlockings, wayside and onboard equipments of CBTC
(Communication Based Train Control) [6].
B. B-PERFect Motivation
In railway domain, due to the existing gap between high-
level system speciﬁcation and low-level software implemen-
tation, the safety assurance is difﬁcult to obtain. Moreover,
gluing the safety risks expressed at the system level with the
software components responsible for handling these risks is
a hard task. The B method is proved useful to reduce this
gap by deﬁning a reﬁnement chain moving from high level
speciﬁcations to low level ones. But, independent assessment
of safety-critical systems developed using the B method with
respect to informal requirements can be complicated and might
be intrusive in some situations. The detection of inconsisten-
cies in invariants cannot be done automatically.
Even though the formal veriﬁcation performed by the B
proof engines can be trusted, the validation of the safety
properties can only be performed by tedious and non efﬁcient
reviewing activities of code or speciﬁcation. .
To address the above constraints, the B-PERFect project
provides an independent alternative for the veriﬁcation of
the safety properties on systems developed using the B
method. According to the PERF approach, the B models
are transformed into HLL models where the required safety
requirements are added for checking the correctness of system
behaviour. By doing so, one can prove additional system
properties. The idea behind this is not to prove again the
already proved properties on the supplied B models but to
guarantee the safety properties which could not be expressed
on the isolated B model due to the absence of its environment.
This process is non intrusive and supports a veriﬁcation of the
integration of all system components.
C. Case study: Train localization in a CBTC system
CBTC [7] is a complex system which uses bidirectional
communication between onboard and wayside equipments in
order to ensure a safe and high performance service. It is
composed of different sub-systems that depend on each sup-
plier’s architecture, speciﬁcation and development formalism.
A CBTC system offers two main functions 1) localization
(onboard), and 2) tracking of trains (wayside). Localization
computes the topological position of trains while tracking uses
Localization to build the cartography of the trains on the whole
network.
In this case study, we are concerned with Train Reference-
Point Localization TRPL function, a sub-function of the Lo-
calization. Given a topology of n line segments, a travelled
distance estimation d and a train position p corresponding to
a segment identiﬁer, an abscissa and an orientation, the TRPL
function computes the new train position p′.
In order to reduce the complexity of the TRPL function,
environment based assumptions are considered i.e. 1) a railway
line is considered as a sequence (consecutive) of segments of
equal length associated with an identiﬁer 2) the train orienta-
tion is a one way and remains the same for all the segments. In
an ideal world, the veriﬁcation can be performed on the high-
level system requirements and their low-level implementation
under the given safety properties. Unfortunately, this is not
possible because either the developed model is too complex
or the given safety properties do not address directly the
developed high-level requirements.
The following requirements are associated to TRPL. First
unitary requirements (checked on the TRPL function in
isolation) and second integration or system requirements,
involving the environment assumptions, are presented.
1) Unitary requirements:
UnitReq1 The train reference point position p
′ shall be
computed according to the given orientation.
UnitReq2
The distance between the current reference
point position p and the next reference point
position p′ shall be equal to the travelled
distance d.
UnitReq3
The train reference point position p shall not
change when the new position goes beyond
the known segments zone n.
2) Integration or system requirements: The system require-
ment on the TRPL function expresses that the reference point
positions are computed on each consecutive segment crossed
by a train. It entails checking that the next segment is not
occupied. Safety speciﬁcations can have different levels of
reﬁnement and not all of the requirements are directly encoded
in the B model as invariant or by implementation. For the
purpose of this paper, observe that this requirement is not
deﬁned in the B model, it is checked at the integrated HLL
model level because it is deﬁned over several models.
SystReq
The next reference point position shall be
on the next segment (adjacent to the current
segment position) in the given orientation
III. CERTIFIED EMBEDDING OF B MODELS
In the context of the B-PERFect project, as mentioned
previously, our aim is to deploy the PERF approach for B
models. We aim at developing a certiﬁed semantic preserving
translator of B models to HLL. We prove that the translator
B2HLL together with its implemented transformation rules
deﬁned in [8] is semantic preserving.
A. Our framework
Our approach is depicted in Fig. 1. It is based on a deep
embedding using the Isabelle/HOL framework as a uniﬁed
formal modelling framework. First, both B and HLL modelling
language semantics are modelled in Isabelle/HOL. Then, an
equivalence relation between these models is formalized. It
is based on a bi-simulation relation (upper part of Fig. 1).
An equivalence theorem is stated and proved (by a structural
induction) once for all.
Speciﬁc B and HLL models are checked to be equivalent as
follows. Each B and HLL models are deﬁned as instances of
these semantic models (Instance of relation on Fig. 1). Then,
the equivalence theorem associated to the deﬁned equivalence
is checked for these two instances. All the proof obligations
are successfully discharged.
Discharging the proof obligations associated to the instan-
tiation of the equivalence theorem (checking the theorem
hypotheses) certiﬁes that B and HLL models are equivalent
according to the deﬁned equivalence relation. The construction
of proofs is mechanical. It is the responsibility of developer
to discharge the veriﬁcation condition in Isabelle/HOL using
different tactics and to prove that the theorem hypotheses hold.
Isabelle/HOL toolkit and its library of tactics are used for this
purpose. Finally, an export tool (lower part of Fig. 1) produces
Isabelle/HOL models for the speciﬁc input B models and HLL
models produced by B2HLL tool.
Fig. 1. A formal framework of certiﬁed translator
B. HLL modelling language
HLL is a formal declarative and synchronous data ﬂow
language close to LUSTRE [3]. HLL models are seen as
typed streams deﬁned as compositions of either temporal or
data operators. Temporal operators describe clock-dependent
expressions while data operators, like arithmetic, logical or
array operators, are used to manipulate streams values (being
either integer or boolean values). The declarative nature of the
language eases the deﬁnition of formal behavioural models
as well as safety properties. A HLL project is organized in
namespaces sections. Streams are declared in declarations
blocks with type checking information, and their values are
given in the deﬁnitions blocks. The proof obligations block
contains a set of properties related to streams for requirement
veriﬁcation purpose. Constraints expressions are used to re-
duce the domain deﬁnition of unbound inputs streams.
C. The B Method
The B method [4] handles complete critical-software devel-
opment processes from speciﬁcation to code using reﬁnement.
A B development process is layered. Each layer corresponds
to an abstraction level and the reﬁnement provides the relation
between layers. B is based on ﬁrst-order logic and set theory.
Models are represented in B as machines. A machine contains
state variables, instances of other machines, type invariants,
an initialization clause and operations acting on the deﬁned
state variables. Generally, B project models represent a state
transition system in which the initialization clause sets the
initial values of variables and the operation clause speciﬁes
how variables are modiﬁed from one state to another. The
invariant (ﬁrst order logic expression) describes the safety
properties of the model. Invariant preservation proof obliga-
tions are generated and need to be discharged in order to assert
machine consistency. The highest level of abstraction is the
speciﬁcation, a representation of functional requirements and
the lowest one corresponds to an implementation where only
programming-like constructs are allowed [9].
D. Isabelle/HOL
In the style of LCF [10], Isabelle/HOL is a generic inter-
active theorem prover for Higher-Order Logic (HOL) [11].
It is based on a meta logic used to encode object logics
like First-Order Logic and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and
offers a natural-deduction-style proof rules. The modelling
part relies on functional programming languages. Basic type
declaration is typedecl(’t1, ’t2, ...) Tnew, where ’ti are possible
type parameters and Tnew is a new deﬁned type. Other type
constructors are available: ti × tj for product and ti ⇒ tj for
function maps. Moreover, it also supports condition, let and
case expressions, which are basic constructs of the functional
languages. Several powerful external provers are integrated in
Isabelle/HOL.
IV. B2HLL: A TRANSLATOR FROM B TO HLL
In [8], we have described the general transformation prin-
ciples from B to HLL, including the B2HLL tool we imple-
mented. Below, we illustrate this transformation and show how
a B model corresponding to the case study of section II-C,
carrying the unitary requirements is translated to a HLL model.
A. From B to HLL 1
Due to the semantic mismatch, the transformation of B
models to HLL models is not straightforward. On the B side,
imperative style is used while data ﬂow paradigm with single
static assignment form (SSA) is used on the HLL side. B
constants are directly translated into HLL constants and the
typing invariants of B are equivalently translated to HLL
datatypes. A particular issue in this transformation concerns
B state variable evolutions and updates. A speciﬁc dataﬂow
shall be deﬁned on the HLL side to record the changes.
B state variables become HLL data streams. Each B state
variable updated in a B conditional statement becomes a
HLL conditional expression that merges the information from
different control ﬂow branches associated to the evolution
of the variable. Expressions, conditionals and loops are also
translated in HLL. Regarding properties, HLL provides the
same quantiﬁers as B language, the translation of B predicates
and B expressions is almost straightforward. Finally, each B
operation is translated to a HLL namespace as a sequence of
assignments. More details on this transformation can be found
in [8].
B. A B model for TRPL
Listing 1-2 shows the obtained implementation of the last
level of a B reﬁnement. The B model associated to the TRPL
deﬁnes the context of the model by introducing constants
for predeﬁned limits (i.e. maximum number of segments,
the length of a segment, maximal distance of displacement).
1The complete B and HLL models are available at:
http://yamine.perso.enseeiht.fr/TASE_Annex.pdf
These constants are used to deﬁne a topolgy of the railway
network in the Typ1, T yp2 and Typ3. The state variables are:
v_segment- a new segment identiﬁer; v_segment_before - a
previous segment identiﬁer; v_absOnSegment - an abscissa
on the current segment; v_absOnSegment_before - a previ-
ous abscissa on the segment; and v_is_segment_found - to
state if a new position is found in the limit of known zone of
segments. They are typed in the Inv1, Inv2, Inv3 and Inv4.
Unitary requirements deﬁned in section II-C are mod-
elled in the invariant clause as safety properties (UnitReq1,
UnitReq2 and UnitReq3).
Several operations are introduced, they modify the state
variables. To illustrate our approach, only the implementation
level of the findLoc procedure is presented. When the new
position of a train remains in its bounds, the ﬁndLoc proce-
dure changes the train reference point position based on a
displacement i_dep, a previous segment i_seg and abscissa
i_abs given as parameters.
IMPLEMENTATION T r a i n P o s i t i o n i n g
. . .
INVARIANT
/ * Typ1 * / t _ s egmen t = 1 . . c_nb_segments
/ * Typ2 * / t _ d ep l a c emen t = 0 . . c_max_dep
/ * Typ3 * / t _ a b s c i s s e = 0 . . c _ s egmen t _ l e ng t h
/ * Inv1 * / v_segment ∈ t _ s egmen t
/ * Inv2 * / v_segmen t_be fo r e ∈ t _ s egmen t
/ * Inv3 * / v_absOnSegment ∈ t _ a b s c i s s e
/ * Inv4 * / v_absOnSegment_before ∈ t _ a b s c i s s e
/ * UnitReq1 * /
( v_ segmen t_be fo r e * c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h ) +
v_absOnSegment_before ≤
( v_segment * c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h ) +
v_absOnSegment
/ * UnitReq2 * /
( v_ isSegmentFound = TRUE⇒∃dd . (
dd ∈ t _ d ep l a c emen t ∧
( v_segment − v_segmen t_be fo r e ) *
c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h + v_absOnSegment =
v_absOnSegment_before + dd ) )
/ * UnitReq3 * /
( v_isSegmentFound = FALSE⇒
( v_ segmen t_be fo r e * c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h ) +
v_absOnSegment_before =
( v_segment * c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h ) +
v_absOnSegment )
. . .
Listing 1. B TRPL Invariants
OPERATIONS
f indLoc ( i _ s eg , i _ ab s , i _dep ) =
VAR l_x , l _ s e g IN
l_x:= i _ a b s + i_dep
; l _ s e g:= i _ s e g
; WHILE c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h < l_x ∧
( l _ s e g < c_nb_segments ) DO
l_x:= l _x − c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h
; l _ s e g:= l _ s e g + 1
INVARIANT
l _ s e g ∈ t _ s egmen t ∧ l _x ∈ NAT
∧ i _ s e g ∈ t _ s egmen t ∧ i _ a b s ∈
t _ a b s c i s s e
∧ i _dep ∈ t _ d ep l a c emen t
∧ ( l _ s e g − i _ s e g ) * c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h
+ l_x
= i _ a b s + i_dep
VARIANT l_x
END
; v_isSegmentFound:= boo l (
c _ s egmen t _ l e ng t h ≥ l _x ∧
( l _ s e g ≤ c_nb_segments ) )
; IF ( v_isSegmentFound = TRUE) THEN
v_absOnSegment:= l _x
; v_segment := l _ s e g
END END
. . .
END
Listing 2. B TRPL Operations
A while loop ensures that the segment identiﬁer is increased
when the train displacement is greater than the length of a
segment. The loop invariant states that the input parameters re-
spect their typing properties and the new train reference point
is correctly computed by preserving the model invariants. The
operation ﬁndLoc is triggered by the main program that models
the current TRPL updates for a train displacement given by
odometry devices. The developed B model is successfully
proved using Atelier B [9] ensuring invariant preservation and
thus fulﬁlling the unitary requirements.
C. A HLL model for TRPL
Starting from the B model described above, a HLL model
is produced by the B2HLL tool according to the transfor-
mation principles deﬁned in section IV-A. B state variables
are represented as ﬂows using cyclic deﬁnition in the HLL
model. For each B implementation, the transformation process
starts by producing corresponding HLL namespaces. Then,
state variables ﬂows are initialized starting from the B ini-
tialisation clause. The next values in the state variables ﬂows
are produced from the transformation of the B operations and
the corresponding programming constructs. This behaviour
is exempliﬁed in listing 3. For example, the v_seg B state
variable is updated with respect to the computed value in the B
operation findLoc. The new computed values of the variable
"v_seg_0" are used as inputs in the model ”findLoc_0” to
compute the next possible values of the variable v_seg. Note
that each state variable named V arName is duplicated using
an integer i sufﬁx V arName_i to avoid side effects and to
allow the HLL model to observe all the internal variables
behaviours.
All the B constructs are transformed into HLL. Assignments
become HLL assignments performed in sequence with a new
integer sufﬁx for each involved variables. Conditional expres-
sions are transformed in two steps. First the then and else
branches are translated, and then the conditional expression
is built. B looping (while) construct is transformed into a
recursive conditional statement. The B variant determines the
number of iterations for termination.
Namespaces : " T r a i n P o s i t i o n i n g _ 0 " { . . .
Types :
i n t [ 1 , c_nb_segments ] t _ s egmen t ;
i n t [ 0 , c_max_dep ] t _ d ep l a c emen t ;
i n t [ 0 , c _ s egmen t _ l e ng t h ] t _ a b s c i s s e ;
D e c l a r a t i o n s :
t _ d ep l a c emen t x_dep l acemen t ;
D e c l a r a t i o n s :
t _ a b s c i s s e v_absOnSeg ;
t _ s egmen t v_seg ;
D e f i n i t i o n s :
v_seg_0 := 1 , v_seg ;
v_absOnSeg_0 := 0 , v_absOnSeg ;
v_seg := v_segment ;
v_absOnSeg := v_absOnSegment ;
. . .
P roo f O b l i g a t i o n s :
(1 ≤ v_segment &
v_segment ≤ c_nb_segments ) ; / / Inv1
(0 ≤ v_absOnSegment & / / Inv3
v_absOnSegment ≤c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h ) ;
/ / Uni tReq1
( p r e ( v_segment , v_seg_0 ) *
c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h +
p r e ( v_absOnSegment , v_absOnSeg_0 ) ≤
v_segment * c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h +
v_absOnSegment )
/ / Uni tReq2
v_isSegmentFound_1 −>
( ( ( v_segment − p r e ( v_segment , v_seg_0 ) )
* c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h + v_absOnSegment ) =
p r e ( v_absOnSegment , v_absOnSeg_0 ) +
: : doLoc_0 : : l_xDep_0 )
/ / Uni tReq3
~( v_isSegmentFound_1 ) −>
( p r e ( v_segment , v_seg_0 ) *
c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h +
p r e ( v_absOnSegment , v_absOnSeg_0 ) =
v_segment * c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h +
v_absOnSegment ) ;
/ / Sys tReq
v_seg = p r e ( v_seg , 1 ) ∨
v_seg = p r e ( v_seg , 1 ) + 1 ;
Listing 3. HLL TRPL Properties
Namespaces : " f i ndLoc_0 "{
D e f i n i t i o n s : / / mapping i n p u t p a r ame t e r s
i_dep_0 := l_xDep_0 ;
i _ ab s_0 := v_absOnSeg_0 ;
i _ s eg_0 := v_seg_0 ;
/ / d i s t a n c e compu t a t i on
l_x_0 := i _ ab s_0 + i_dep_0 ;
l _ s eg_0 := i _ s eg_0 ;
/ / Begin While I t e r 0
l_x_1 := l_x_0 − c_ s egmen t _ l e ng t h ;
l _ s eg_1 := l _ s eg_0 + 1 ;
l_x_2 := i f c _ s egmen t _ l e ng t h < l_x_0 &
( l _ s eg_0 < c_nb_segments )
t h en l_x_1 e l s e l_x_0 ;
l _ s eg_2 := i f c _ s egmen t _ l e ng t h < l_x_0 &
( l _ s eg_0 < c_nb_segments )
t h en l _ s eg_1 e l s e l _ s eg_0 ;
. . . / / End I t e r 0
v_absOnSegment_1 := l_x_20 ; / / IF cond
v_segment_1 := l _ s eg_20 ; / / IF body
v_segment_2 := i f ( v_isSegmentFound_1== t r u e )
t h en v_segment_1
e l s e v_segment_0 ;
v_absOnSegment_2 := i f ( v_isSegmentFound_1
== t r u e )
t h en v_absOnSegment_1
e l s e v_absOnSegment_0 ;
. . . }
D e f i n i t i o n s : / / S t a t e v a r i a b l e s u pd a t e s
v_segment_1 := : : " f i ndLoc_0 " : : v_segment_2 ;
v_isSegmentFound_1 := : : " f i ndLoc_0 " : :
v_isSegmentFound_1 ;
v_absOnSegment_1 := : : " f i ndLoc_0 " : :
v_absOnSegment_2 ;
v_isSegmentFound := v_isSegmentFound_1 ;
v_absOnSegment := v_absOnSegment_1 ;
v_segment := v_segment_1 ;
. . . }
Listing 4. HLL TRPL Operations
The B invariants are transformed into HLL Proof Obligations
clause encoding the safety properties. All the unitary require-
ments are derived from the B INVARIANT clause.
D. System analysis
Up to now, all the properties established in B are also the
properties of the HLL model. One may ask what is the added
value of such a transformation.
The interest of integrating the models in the HLL framework
is double. First it allows to have a shared model obtained
for various modelling languages and second it allows to
check global properties at system level using a non intrusive
approach (the source models are not modiﬁed). For exam-
ple, the system requirement SystReq encoded in HLL (not
expressed in the B model) as presented in listing 5 requires
that, when a train moves, the next segment associated to the
new train position is either the same one or the next one.
The requirement does not allow trains to move forward to any
segment. Only consecutive segment changes are allowed.
Proof Ob l i ga t i on s : / / SystReq
v_seg = pre ( v_seg , 1 ) ∨ v_seg = pre ( v_seg , 1 ) + 1;
Listing 5. System level Requirement
This requirement is not fulﬁlled by the produced HLL model
shown above and the proof engine revealed a counter-example.
The corresponding scenario was analyzed to understand the
risk related to this property violation. This analysis revealed
a possible environment restriction hypothesis related to the
limitation of the maximum travelled distance (therefore of the
speed, of the period of sensing position, etc.) in a cycle.
V. CERTIFIED TRANSLATION
This section addresses the last step of the formal veriﬁca-
tion and validation process we have set up when using the
PERF framework. It consists in certifying the transformation
process by formally guaranteeing semantic preservation after
translation. We give the details of the Isabelle/HOL based
certiﬁcation process deﬁned in section III-A.
Our goal is to show that the semantics of a source B model
is preserved with the semantics of the translated HLL model.
For this purpose, we deﬁne an equivalence relationship using
a weak bi-simulation relationship relating B states and HLL
ﬂows. A deep embedding approach is deﬁned. It consists
in formalizing B, HLL and the equivalence relationship in
Isabelle/HOL and prove that the transformation preserves
equivalence. The proof is a structural induction on the con-
structs of the modelling language and on the transformation
rules. Isabelle/HOL data-types and functions formalize all the
concepts of both B and HLL. Below we give the main structure
of this deep embedding.
A. Types and values
Isabelle/HOL data-types modelling features and constructs
of B and HLL (states, ﬂows, expressions, modelling state-
ments) are deﬁned. Variables names, variable values and an
environment function associating variables to their values are
introduced in Listing 6 where Tval represents primitive types,
varname deﬁnes a variable name with the associated type
(powerset) and env is the environment function.
data type Tval = Bool | I n t
type_synonym varname = "name × Tval "
type_synonym env = " varname ⇒ v a l "
Listing 6. Environment function for variables
B. B Semantics in Isabelle/HOL
The semantics of B is described using a semantic function
structurally deﬁned on each B syntactic constructs.
1) B Syntax: Speciﬁc data-types for arithmetic ex-
pressions aexp, boolean expressions bexp and B state-
ments instruction (a bloc of instructions for sequence,
skip, assignment, and conditional) are deﬁned in List-
ings 7, 8, and 9 respectively to model B abstract syntax.
datatype aexp =
Value i n t
| AVar vname
| P l u s aexp aexp
| Times aexp aexp
| Minus aexp aexp
| Uminus aexp
Listing 7. Arith-
metic expressions
datatype bexp =
Value boo l | Neq aexp aexp
| Bvar vname | Not bexp
| And bexp bexp | Or bexp bexp
| Leq aexp aexp | Eq aexp aexp
| Equiv bexp bexp | Lt aexp aexp
| Gt aexp aexp | Greq aexp aexp
Listing 8. Boolean expressions
datatype i n s t r u c t i o n =
Bl " i n s t r u c t i o n l i s t "
| SKIP
| Ass ign vname exp
| I f bexp
i n s t r u c t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n
Listing 9. Statements
2) B Semantics: The semantics of B constructs is de-
ﬁned using primitive recursive functions encoded in Is-
abelle/HOL. B expressions are interpreted by the total function
meaning_exp ∈ exp → env → val. An expression is
evaluated in the environment env. The semantics of B state-
ments is given by the total function meaning_instruction ∈
instruction → env → env. It updates the environ-
ment env with the effect of the interpreted instruction.
Listing 10 provides the deﬁnition of the semantic function
meaning_instruction.
fun me a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n : : " i n s t r u c t i o n ⇒ env ⇒ env " where
" m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( SKIP ) σ = σ "
| " m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( Bl l i s t ) σ = ( c a s e l i s t o f [ ] ⇒σ
| e # l ⇒ me a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( Bl l ) ( m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n e σ ) ) "
| " m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( Ass ign ( vn , Tva l . Bool ) ( Bexp exp ) ) σ =
σ ( ( vn , Tva l . Bool ) := B ( meaning_b exp σ ) ) "
| " m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( Ass ign ( vn , Tva l . I n t ) ( Aexp exp ) ) σ =
σ ( ( vn , Tva l . I n t ) := I ( meaning_a exp σ ) "
| " m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( I f c b1 b2 ) σ =
( i f meaning_b c σ t h en me a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n b1 σ e l s e m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n b2 σ ) "
Listing 10. Semantics of B statements
3) The case of loops: The above deﬁned semantic function
does not handle the while loop B statement. As mentioned
in section IV-C the transformation tool translates such a loop
to the recursive function b_while_to_if with conditional (see
Listing 11). In this Listing, we observe that the function is
called a nb number of times corresponding to the original
B VARIANT value. It produces a sequence of if then else
statements in a bloc Bl. In other words, each loop is unfolded
recursively to a sequence of if then else statements.
fun b _wh i l e _ t o _ i f : : " n a t ⇒ bexp ⇒ i n s t r u c t i o n ⇒ i n s t r u c t i o n " where
" b _wh i l e _ t o _ i f 0 _ _ = SKIP " |
" b _wh i l e _ t o _ i f ( Suc nb ) c i = Bl [ I f c i SKIP , ( b _wh i l e _ t o _ i f nb c i ) ] "
Listing 11. A recursive function encoding while loops
The built-in ﬁxpoint operator available in Isabelle/HOL deﬁnes
the semantics of such recursive functions. Therefore, the
conditional is enough to translate the whole B constructs of
the IMPLEMENTATION level.
4) TRPL model of B in Isabelle/HOL: The developed model
of the selected case study is embedded (exported as instance)
in Isabelle/HOL. All the state variables are ﬂattened. All
the TRPL operations are directly encoded in Isabelle/HOL
applying the formalized B semantics.
C. HLL Semantics in Isabelle/HOL
As for B, the semantics of HLL in Isabelle/HOL is given.
The HLL ﬂows (streams) are deﬁned as total functions map-
ping naturals on a polymorphic data-type in Listing 12.
type_synonym ’ a s t r e am = " n a t ⇒ ’ a "
data type v a l = B " boo l s t r e am " | I " i n t s t r e am "
Listing 12. Data type for HLL ﬂows (streams)
HLL variables are deﬁned as (name×Tval)×nat. In addition,
each variable is identiﬁed using a unique natural number.
1) HLL Syntax: Similarly to B, speciﬁc data-types for
arithmetic expressions aexp, boolean expressions bexp and
statements instruction are deﬁned. A speciﬁc expression
is the conditional expression is added. Last, statements
(bloc of assignements as instructions) are deﬁned. Listings
13, 14, and 15 show these deﬁnitions in Isabelle/HOL.
data type aexp =
Value " i n t s t r e am "
| AVar vname
| P l u s aexp aexp
| Times aexp aexp
| Minus aexp aexp
| Uminus aexp
Listing 13. Arith-
metic Expression
data type bexp =
Value " boo l s t r e am "
| Neq aexp aexp
| Bvar vname | Not bexp
| And bexp bexp | Or bexp bexp
| Leq aexp aexp | Eq aexp aexp
| Equiv bexp bexp | Lt aexp aexp
| Gt aexp aexp | Greq aexp aexp
Listing 14. Boolean
Expression
data type exp =
Bexp bexp
| Aexp aexp
| I f bexp exp exp
data type i n s t r u c t i o n =
Bl " i n s t r u c t i o n l i s t "
| Ass ign vname exp
| Assign ’ vname exp exp
Listing 15. Expression
and Statements
2) HLL Semantics: The semantics of the HLL language
imposes that the updating of the ﬂows is performed in a
synchronous manner i.e. the ﬂows are modiﬁed simultaneously
and there is no side effect. The function stream_comp (see
Listing 16) has been deﬁned in order to compose different
stream values. This function is call by the semantic function
interpreting the HLL statements.
fun
s t ream_comp : : " v a l ⇒ v a l ⇒ v a l "
where
" stream_comp (B v1 ) (B v2 ) =
B(λ i . i f i =0 t h en v1 0 e l s e
v2 ( i−1)) "
| " s t ream_comp ( I v1 ) ( I v2 ) =
I (λ i . i f i =0 t h en v1 0 e l s e
v2 ( i−1)) "
Listing 16. Flow
composition
fun meaning_exp : : " exp ⇒ env ⇒ v a l " where
" meaning_exp ( Bexp ex ) σ = B ( meaning_b ex σ ) "
| " meaning_exp ( Aexp ex ) σ = I ( meaning_a ex σ ) "
| " meaning_exp ( I f c b1 b2 ) σ = ( l e t ( va l1 , v a l 2 ) =
( ( meaning_exp b1 σ ) , ( meaning_exp b2 σ ) ) i n (
c a s e ( va l1 , v a l 2 ) o f
( ( I b1 ) , ( I b2 ) ) ⇒ I (λ i . ( i f meaning_b c σ i
t h en b1 i e l s e b2 i ) )
| ( (B b1 ) , (B b2 ) ) ⇒B (λ i . ( i f meaning_b c σ i
t h en b1 i e l s e b2 i ) ) ) ) "
Listing 17. Semantics of HLL Expressions
Like for B, the HLL semantics is given by semantic func-
tions deﬁned structurally on the corresponding syntactic con-
structs. The deﬁned function meaning_exp ∈ exp → env →
val interprets expressions while the meaning_instruction ∈
instruction → env → env function updates the environment
of ﬂows according to the semantics of the HLL statement (See
Listings 17 and 18).
fun me a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n : : " i n s t r u c t i o n ⇒ env ⇒ env " where
" m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( Bl l i s t ) σ =
( c a s e l i s t o f [ ] ⇒σ
| e # l ⇒ me a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( Bl l ) ( m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n e σ ) ) "
| " m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( Ass ign vn exp ) σ = σ ( vn := meaning_exp exp σ ) "
| " m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n ( Assign ’ vn exp1 exp2 ) σ = ( l e t v1 = meaning_exp exp1 σ i n
l e t v2 = meaning_exp exp2 σ i n σ ( vn := stream_comp v1 v2 ) ) "
Listing 18. Semantics of HLL statements
3) TRPL model of HLL in Isabelle/HOL: Like for B, the
HLL model of the selected case study, obtained by transforma-
tion, is embedded (exported as instance) in the Isabelle/HOL.
All the state variables are ﬂattened. Note that the HLL
formalization in Isabelle/HOL does not take into account the
notion of Namespaces. To address this issue the HLL variable
names are preﬁxed with the name of the namespace where
they are declared.
D. Certiﬁcation of the translation
Once the B and HLL semantics are encoded in Is-
abelle/HOL, we have to formally deﬁne the transformation
function and the equivalence theorem asserting semantic
preservation. We describe the speciﬁcation of the B2HLL
translation [8] in Isabelle/HOL and then discuss the semantic
preservation by deﬁning an equivalence relationship.
1) The Transformation Function: This function is deﬁned
on the syntactic constructs identiﬁed for both B and HLL.
First, we address the mapping of B state variables to HLL
ﬂows (streams) which require a speciﬁc process. Each B
variable identiﬁer is mapped to a pair of HLL identiﬁers by
Mapping = Bvname → (Hllvname × Hllvname) where
the ﬁrst one is used for expression evaluation and the second
one for mapping updates.
B Expressions and statements are transformed by T_exp ∈
Bexp → Mapping → HLLexp and Transformation ∈
Binstruction → Mapping → (HLLinstruction ×
mapping) functions, respectively. For both expressions and
statements, the deﬁned Mapping for variables is used to
retrieve the HLL variable associated to each B variable.
fun T r a n s f o rma t i o n : : " b . i n s t r u c t i o n ⇒ mapping ⇒ ( h l l . i n s t r u c t i o n × mapping ) " where
" T r a n s f o rma t i o n ( b . Bl [ ] ) m = ( h l l . Bl [ ] , m) "
| " T r a n s f o rma t i o n ( b . Bl ( a# l i s t ) ) m = ( comp ( T r a n s f o rma t i o n a m) (
T r a n s f o rma t i o n ( b . Bl l i s t ) ) ) "
| " T r a n s f o rma t i o n b . SKIP m = ( h l l . Bl [ ] , m) "
| " T r a n s f o rma t i o n ( b . Ass ign vname exp ) m =
( l e t v = ( c r e a t eF r e s hHLLVa r i a b l e vname m) i n
( h l l . Ass ign v ( T_exp exp m) , m( vname 	→ ( v , v ) ) ) ) "
| " T r a n s f o rma t i o n ( b . I f bexp i n s t r u c t i o n 1 i n s t r u c t i o n 2 ) m =
( l e t
(* c ’ =⇒Cond i t i o n t r a n s f o rm a t i o n * )
c ’ = ( T_exp ( b . Bexp ( bexp ) ) m) ;
(* c1 =⇒ IF b l o c k t r a n s f o rm a t i o n and m1=⇒ R e s u l t i n g mapping *)
( c1 ,m1) = T r a n s f o rma t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n 1 m;
(* c2 =⇒E l s e b l o c k t r a n s f o rm a t i o n and m2=⇒ R e s u l t i n g mapping *)
( c2 ,m2) = T r a n s f o rma t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n 2 (m ⊗ m1) ;
(* va r s =⇒Mod i f i e d va r s i n one o f IF branches * )
v a r s = {v . v : ( dom m) ∧ ( (m v = m1 v ) ∨ (m v = m2 v ) ) } ;
i n s t = λ i v . ( c a s e ( snd v ) o f Tva l . Bool ⇒ ( h l l . Bexp o h l l . Bvar )
| Tva l . I n t ⇒ h l l . Aexp o h l l . AVar ) ;
(* s t =⇒F ina l s t a t e a f t e r IF *)
s t = F i n i t e _ S e t . f o l d ( T _ i f _ s t e p _ s t ) m2 v a r s ;
(* L i s t o f a s s i g n s f o r mod i f i e d va r s * )
a s s i g n s = F i n i t e _ S e t . f o l d ( T _ i f _ s t e p _ i m1 m2 i n s t c ’ s t ) {} v a r s
i n ( Bl ( [ c1 , c2 ]@( s e t _ t o _ l i s t a s s i g n s ) ) , s t ) ) "
Listing 19. B to HLL Transformation Function in Isabelle/HOL
The transformation functions are deﬁned inductively on the
syntactic constructs of the B modelling language. Listing
19 shows the deﬁnition of transformation functions in Is-
abelle/HOL.
2) The equivalence relationship: We deﬁne equivalence on
state variables using an observational (bisimulation) relation
[12] between states on the B side and HLL ﬂows on the other
side. Listing 20 deﬁnes this relation for the case of integer and
boolean types. It has to be deﬁned for all other types.
d e f i n i t i o n meaning_equ iv : : " b . env ⇒ mapping ⇒ h l l . env ⇒ boo l " ( " _∼= _ _ " ) where
" b∼=m h ≡∀ v ∈ ( dom m) . c a s e v of
( vname , Tva l . Bool ) ⇒ ( ( b v ) boo l ( ( h o ( f s t o ( t h e o m) ) ) v ) )
| ( vname , Tva l . I n t ) ⇒ ( ( b v )  i n t ( ( h o ( f s t o ( t h e o m) ) ) v ) ) "
Listing 20. State equivalence Relation (bi-simulation)
This deﬁnition deﬁnes the initial property of the inductive
proof process of semantic preservation.
3) Asserting the correctness of transformation: All the
ingredients to write the equivalence theorem are available.
Listing 21 describes the global equivalence theorem deﬁning
the semantic preservation property. Let CodeB and codeHLL
be a B code and a HLL code, and σB and σHLL be two states
for B and HLL respectively (lines 1 and 2 in Listing 21) such
that σB and σHLL are equivalent by the meaning_equiv
relation (line 5 in Listing 21). This theorem asserts under
the assumption that the transformation of the codeB gives a
codeHLL (Line 4 in Listing 21), the meaning_equiv relation
holds on the semantics of the codeB and codeHLL in the
states σB and σHLL, respectively (Line 10 in Listing 21).
theorem Equ i v a l e n c e :
1 . f i x e s codeB : : " b . i n s t r u c t i o n " and σB : : " b . env "
2 . and codeHLL : : " h l l . i n s t r u c t i o n " and σHLL : : " h l l . env "
3 . and n m: : mapping
4 . assumes * : " ( codeHLL , m) = T r a n s f o rma t i o n codeB n "
5 . and # : "σB ∼=n σHLL "
6 . and $ : " f i n i t e ( dom n ) "
7 . and @ : " we l l _ d e f i n e d codeB n "
8 . and ♣ : " we l l _de f i n ed_mapp ing n "
9 . and ~ : " w e l l _ d e f i n e d _ s t a t e σHLL "
shows
10 . " ( b . m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n codeB σB ) ∼= m
( h l l . m e a n i n g _ i n s t r u c t i o n codeHLL σHLL ) "
Listing 21. Main Equivalence Theorem
4) Proving semantic preservation: The proof of the equiv-
alence theorem of Listing 21 is performed using the theorem
prover of Isabelle/HOL. Most of the proofs are interactive
(semi-automatic), they are completed through user interaction
with the theorem prover of Isabelle/HOL.
A structural induction with case based reasoning (for each
syntactic construct) have been set up. These cases have been
decomposed into several lemmas which have been used for
the proof of the main equivalence theorem. However, some
complex transformation rules may require more elaborated
proofs. For example, the semantic preservation proof for if
conditional requires more than 300 lines of proof script and
uses 25 lemmas to complete the proof.
In summary, the proof of the correctness of the transfor-
mation from B to HLL represents more than 5000 lines of
proof scripts for discharging the proof obligations related to
the transformation associated to the equivalence proofs.
VI. THE TRANSFORMATION AT WORK
The previous sections showed a complete transformation
process together with a proof of equivalence. Theorem prover
is a standard approach that can be used to prove the given
properties in form of lemmas and theorems by checking every
possible states of the system. Trying to prove an incorrect
proposition may lead to dead-ends or considerable time loss.
Therefore, the idea of debugging proofs by testing the conjunc-
tures is helpful. Model animation is a powerful technique to
perform such tests. We have used a model animator, available
in the Isabelle/HOL tool, to validate our transformation on
several examples, they helped to identify the right formlisation
of deﬁnitions, lemmas and theorems.
Moreover, we have used model animation on the TRPL
case study presented in section II-C for the models deﬁned in
sections IV-B and IV-C. By animating the main equivalence
proof, we have shown that the output HLL model computed
by the B2HLL tool is equivalent to the source B model, with
respect to the deﬁned transformation rules. In the process
of safety assessment, the validation of the translator is an
important step. Even though the B to HLL transformation is
automatic, the model animation is interactive. This approach
was applied to several case studies provided by RATP and the
industrialization of the tool is ongoing.
VII. RELATED WORK
The formal validation and certiﬁcation of translators has
been studied by several authors. In general, the compiler is
regarded as a black box and the semantic equivalence is
established by performing proofs based on semantic relation-
ships between source and target programs. Many contributions
studied compiler certiﬁcation for various language paradigms
using different provers. [13] shows the formal veriﬁcation
of transformation of Java programs to Java byte code using
Isabelle/HOL. [14] presents a formal approach for translating
imperative code, such as C and C++, into the synchronous
formalism Signal [15]. In this work, model-checker is used
to check the required properties. Pop et al. [16] present non-
standard denotational speciﬁcation of the SSA form, including
its conversion from imperative languages to SSA, and vice
versa. A similar approach is presented in [17] for the SSA
formalization. An automatic generation of correct program
translation is described in [18]. The semantic equivalence of
the source and the target code is showed using a simulation
based proof. The CompCert compiler [19] is a formally
certiﬁed translator using Coq proof assistant [20] to generate
the assembly code from the C language. The generated code
is obtained directly from the theorem prover. Formal compiler
veriﬁcation is presented in [21], [22] using LUSTRE. [23],
[24] present synchronous versus sequential code validation
based on the proof strategy. In our work, we have adopted the
similar approach to establish an equivalence relation between
the semantic states of the two models that can be preserved by
the execution steps. Compared to the other approaches, ours
is open and does not rely on any speciﬁc modelling language.
VIII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a complete formal veriﬁcation process
for checking requirements at both functional and system
level on B models. The approach consists in integrating B
models and environment assumptions and constraints in a
single modelling framework (HLL). Our work deﬁned a formal
technique, related to model translation, to verify and to validate
the safety critical software developed using the B modelling
language. HLL language is used as a basis for safety properties
veriﬁcation in order to bridge the gap between the software
speciﬁcation, such as the formal development in B, and the
veriﬁcation techniques on system level. In our work, we
proposed a formal framework to guarantee the correctness
of the translation from B models to HLL models. The cor-
rectness of the translation rules is proven in Isabelle/HOL
theorem prover. A proof of equivalence between B and HLL
semantics based on a bi-simulation relationship has been set
up. It guarantees that the translation rules implemented in the
B2HLL tool are correct i.e. semantic preserving according to
the deﬁned equivalence relation. The formalization and the
associated proofs presented in this work can be easily extended
to other transformation from state based language to HLL. The
developed approach is currently being integrated in the PERF
tool suite used at the RATP company.
As future work, our objective is to extend this veriﬁcation
process to higher abstraction levels of B developments (re-
ﬁnements). Such an extension offers the capability to perform
formal veriﬁcation at early stages of the development and
avoid time and resource consuming veriﬁcation at code level.
Our approach consists in seeing operations (functions and
procedures) as black boxes abstracted by their before-after
predicates. The main difﬁculty remains in formalizing abstract
and concrete variables together with the gluing invariants.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Benaissa, D. Bonvoisin, A. Feliachi, and J. Ordioni, “The perf
approach for formal veriﬁcation,” in RSSRail, 2016, pp. 203–214.
[2] J. Ordioni, N. Breton, and J.-L. Colaço, “HLL v.2.7 Modelling
Language Speciﬁcation,” RATP, Tech. Rep., 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01799749
[3] N. Halbwachs, P. Caspi, P. Raymond, and D. Pilaud, “The synchronous
data ﬂow programming language lustre,” Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 79, no. 9, pp. 1305–1320, 1991.
[4] J. R. Abrial, The B-book: assigning programs to meanings. Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1996.
[5] M. R. Prasad, A. Biere, and A. Gupta, “A survey of recent advances in
sat-based formal veriﬁcation,” International Journal on Software Tools
for Technology Transfer, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 156–173, 2005.
[6] A. Feliachi, D. Bonvoisin, C. Samira, and J. Ordioni, “Formal veriﬁca-
tion of system-level safety properties on railway software,” 2016.
[7] “Ieee standard for communications-based train control (cbtc) perfor-
mance and functional requirements,” IEEE Std 1474.1-1999, 1999.
[8] A. Halchin, A. Feliachi, N. K. Singh, Y. A. Ameur, and J. Ordioni, “B-
perfect - applying the PERF approach to B based system developments,”
in RSSRail, 2017, pp. 160–172.
[9] ClearSy, “Atelier b user manual version 4.0,” 2009.
[10] M. J. C. Gordon, R. Milner, and C. P. Wadsworth, Edinburgh LCF, ser.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 1979, vol. 78. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-09724-4
[11] T. Nipkow, M. Wenzel, and L. C. Paulson, Isabelle/HOL: A Proof
Assistant for Higher-order Logic. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[12] D. Sangiorgi, “On the bisimulation proof method,” Mathematical Struc-
tures in Computer Science, vol. 8, no. 5, p. 447–479, 1998.
[13] M. Strecker, “Formal veriﬁcation of a java compiler in isabelle,” in
Automated Deduction—CADE-18, A. Voronkov, Ed. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2002, pp. 63–77.
[14] L. Besnard, T. Gautier, M. Moy, J.-P. Talpin, K. Johnson, and F. Maran-
inchi, “Automatic translation of c/c++ parallel code into synchronous
formalism using an ssa intermediate form,” vol. 23, 2009.
[15] A. Gamati, Designing Embedded Systems with the SIGNAL Program-
ming Language: Synchronous, Reactive Speciﬁcation, 1st ed. Springer
Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2009.
[16] S. Pop, P. Jouvelot, and G. A. Silber, “In and Out of SSA : a Denotational
Speciﬁcation,” in Workshop Static Single-Assignment Form Seminar,
2009.
[17] J. O. Blech and S. Glesner, “A formal correctness proof for code
generation from ssa form in isabelle/hol,” in GI Jahrestagung, 2004.
[18] J. O. Blech and A. Poetzsch-Heffter, “A certifying code generation
phase,” Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., vol. 190, no. 4, pp. 65–
82, Nov. 2007.
[19] X. Leroy, “Formal veriﬁcation of a realistic compiler,” Commun. ACM,
vol. 52, no. 7, pp. 107–115, 2009.
[20] Y. Bertot and P. Castéran, Interactive theorem proving and program
development. Coq’Art: The Calculus of inductive constructions., 2004.
[21] T. Bourke, L. Brun, P.-E. Dagand, X. Leroy, M. Pouzet, and L. Rieg,
“A formally veriﬁed compiler for lustre,” in Proceedings of the 38th
ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation. ACM, 2017, pp. 586–601.
[22] D. Biernacki, J. louis Colaco, and M. Pouzet, “Clock-directed modular
code generation from synchronous block diagrams,” in APGES, 2007.
[23] M. Ryabtsev and O. Strichman, “Translation validation: From simulink
to c,” in Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, 2009, pp. 696–701.
[24] A. Pnueli, O. Shtrichman, and M. Siegel, “Translation validation: From
signal to c,” in Correct System Design, Recent Insight and Advances.
Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 231–255.
